The Determinants and Effects of Training at Work: Bringing the Workplace Back in by O'Connell, Philip J. & Byrne, Delma
The Determinants and Effects
of Training at Work: Bringing
the Workplace Back in
Philip J. O’Connell and Delma Byrne
This article brings together two research fields: work-related training and high-
performance work practices (HPWP). We estimate models of both the determinants and
the impact of training. Our models of the determinants of training confirm previous
research: age, education, contract, tenure, and firm size all influence training. Several
components of HPWP are associated with a higher probability of training, specifically
general (non-firm-specific) training. Participation in general training is associated with
higher earnings, as is involvement in highly participative and consultative working
arrangements, and performance reward systems. These patterns of training and returns
to training are broadly consistent with HPWP approaches and represent a challenge to
human capital theory. We used propensity score matching techniques and Rosenbaum
bounds to test for selection in our models of both training and wages.
Introduction
There has been a resurgence of interest in recent years
in the importance of education and training in fur-
thering the goals of economic progress, fuller employ-
ment, and social integration. This resurgence of
interest in learning coincides with renewed interest
in the features of organizations that promote organiza-
tional performance and enterprise profitability. These
organizational factors include high-performance work
practices (HPWP) such as team working, employee
involvement, and innovative incentive systems, as well
as new technology and labour force flexibility. In general,
research has tended to deal with these two important
fields of inquiry in a fragmented manner, despite their
obvious interconnections in the workplace. This article
combines the two perspectives. In examining the deter-
minants of training at work, we look not only at
the influence of personal and job characteristics but
also at the impact of HPWP and other dimension of
change in the workplace. In looking at the impact
of training on employee wages, we also examine the
impact of high performance working arrangements
and examine whether training has a greater impact
when it is combined with such innovative working
arrangements. In the next section, we outline two
theoretical approaches that have important implications
for workplace training: human capital and HPWP
approaches. In the ‘Empirical research on the deter-
minants of training’ section, we review the research
findings relating to the determinants of training and in
the ‘Wage effects of training and HPWP’ section its
effects on wages. The ‘Data and findings’ section presents
our data and findings, and finally, last section presents
our conclusions.
Theoretical Framework
The dominant theoretical framework informing most
of the research attempting to understand patterns of
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participation in training has been the human capital
approach. This approach, deriving from Becker (1975),
situates the training participation decision in a clas-
sical utility maximizing framework within competitive
labour markets: individual workers undertake training,
and employers invest in training, on the basis of their
estimates of future returns (including employment
prospects and wages for the former and product-
ivity gains for the latter). With regard to training at
work, the human capital approach emphasizes the key
distinction between ‘general’ versus ‘specific’ training.
General training is defined in terms of its transfer-
ability: general training may be of use to current and
subsequent employers, whereas specific training is
of use only to the current employer. In this approach,
employers will be unlikely to pay for general training.
If employers were to pay for general training, they
would have to recoup the cost by paying a wage below
marginal productivity after training, and in a com-
petitive labour market, the workers would leave to
earn their full marginal product with another employ-
er. This gives rise to the poaching problem, whereby
‘non-training’ employers can pay higher rates to
workers who have received general training from a
previous employer. This has obvious implications
for who bears the cost of training, and a consequence
of this market failure is that there is underinvestment
in training. Extensions of the theory suggest that
employees pay for general training either directly
or in the form of lower wages during the training
period.
This hypothesis does not receive much support from
the empirical literature, which has found: (i) that the
theoretical distinction is difficult to operationalize and
(ii) that many employers pay for both general and
specific training. Most job-related training appears to
be general and at least partially paid for by the
employer. This is confirmed by findings from Booth
and Bryan (2002) in relation to the UK; Pischke (2000)
in Germany; and Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) and
Bishop (1994) in the United States. For example,
Booth and Bryan (2002) found that about 85 per cent
of respondents to the British Household Panel Survey
considered their training to be general in nature and
89 per cent reported that it was employer financed.
O’Connell (2004) shows that almost 80 per cent of
employees in an Irish survey who received employer-
sponsored training considered that the training was
general and could be used both in their current job
or be of use to another employer. Evertsson’s (2004)
analysis of an employee survey in Sweden shows
that only about 5 per cent of training is regarded as
firm specific in Sweden and another 38 per cent is
industry- but not firm specific, and over half is general
and fully portable across sectors and firms.
A key assumption of the human capital approach is
that labour markets are perfectly competitive, which is,
of course, an idealized notion. This assumption
underpins the idea that employees can capture the
full return on the investment in (general) training,
either by earning their marginal product with their
current employer or by moving to a different employ-
er. Much of the recent literature has challenged this
assumption. An important article by Acemoglu and
Pischke (1999) argues that compressed wage structures,
which may arise due to trade union organization or
to collective bargaining at sectoral or national levels,
alter the incentive structure and give rise to a
situation in which wages of trained workers, relative
to untrained, are held down, with the result that
employers can capture at least some of the returns to
training. Other reasons advanced for why employers
may pay for general training also emphasize departures
from perfect competition in the labour market,
including transaction costs (including asymmetrical
information), institutional factors (including trade
unions and internal labour markets), and labour
market regulation (such as employment protection
legislation or minimum wages; Acemoglu and Pischke,
1999, 2003). Much of the empirical literature suggests
that institutions are important in moderating the
influence of competitive labour markets and thus
lowering the barriers to employer sponsorship of
training in general, and general training in particular.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) develop a model in
which training is determined within long-term con-
tracts, including minimum wage guarantees. Bassanini
and Brunello (2003), in an analysis of European
Community Household Panel Survey (ECHP) data
for seven countries, find that the incidence of general
training (proxied by off-site training) is higher in
sectors with lower differentials between wage growth
of trained versus untrained workers. They find no
evidence of a relationship between firm-specific train-
ing and the training wage premium. Brunello (2001)
finds that countries with higher union density, stronger
employment protection, and lower minimum wages
tend to show higher incidence of training.
The development of the human capital approach led
to an emphasis on the competitive labour market,
arguably, mainly on the supply side, and to the neglect
of processes, institutions, and relationships in the
workplace. Rapid developments in the organization
and technology of production and service delivery in a
context of progressive globalization have led to
increased attention to the way work is organized and
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the adoption of HPWP. We use HPWP as a summary
term to refer to a collection of innovative systems for
the organization of work, including flat hierarchical
structures, team working, greater participation of
employees in decision making, quality programmes,
job rotation, and innovative payment or incentive
schemes (see Appelbaum and Blatt, 1994; Mandel
and Levine, 2004). The central argument uniting the
various strands of the approach is that the adoption
of HPWP can benefit employers through enhanced
productivity and performance, and at least in some
versions, may also benefit their employees through
higher wages and greater job satisfaction as well as
other subjective measures of welfare. There is little
consensus on what constitutes HPWP, and on how
to measure their components. Most authors define
HPWS or other forms of workplace innovations in
terms of combinations of work practices from a list
that may include employee involvement or participa-
tion in decision making, enhanced communication,
team working, quality circles, incentivized reward
systems, or flexible working arrangements (see for
example Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski et al., 1996).
Firms adopting HPWP are also likely to imple-
ment special training measures in order to enhance
employees’ capacities to implement innovative work
practices. Indeed Appelbaum et al. (2000) see training
as a core component of HPWP, in addition to the
opportunities to participate in decision making and
incentive systems that encourage skill acquisition,
participation, and employee retention. Similarly,
Becker and Gerhardt (1996) argue that HPWP includes
training, self-managed teams, incentivized pay, and
quality circles, while Kalmi and Kauhanen (2008)
employ the first three of these, as well as traditional
teams and information sharing in their operational-
ization of workplace innovations. Whitfield (2000)
argues that the introduction of HPWP involves
workers taking on a higher level of skill and that
many of the new practices require those closely
involved in the production process becoming skilled
problem solvers, implying that more training is
required. Increased flexibility of assignment associated
with HPWP also requires a wider range of skills, again,
implying heavier reliance on training to implement
HPWP.
Not only are HPWP likely to increase the demand
for skills and training but also their adoption has
implications for the types of training in which
employers will be willing to invest. Successful imple-
mentation of HPWP requires enhanced capacity of
workers directly involved in production and service
delivery to perform more complex tasks, or to conduct
statistical analysis of quality issues, or to use soft skills
such as problem solving or interaction skills in order
to facilitate effective team working (Osterman 2006).
Most of these skill requirements appear general in
nature. Lynch and Black (1998) in their analysis of
US employer data, found that employers who had
adopted elements of HPWS (total quality management
or benchmarking) trained a greater proportion of
their workers and that the training was more likely to
be general in nature, such as computer training,
teamwork training, and basic education. In this
respect, HPWP differs sharply from the human capital
approach, which expects that employers will not pay
for general training. This is not to say that training
within a HPWP context is exclusively general. Handel
and Levine (2004) argue that new work practices may
also require more firm-specific skills.
HPWP represent a context in which innovative work
practices are complemented by skill development
practices as well as employee retention and security
policies (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Godard 2001). To the
extent that HPWP entail expectations of enduring
employment relationships, employers need to worry
less that trained employees will be poached by other
employers—a key barrier to training investment
identified by the human capital approach—and thus
may be more willing to provide both general and
firm-specific training.
Empirical Research on the
Determinants of Training
There is a substantial body of evidence indicating that
in-career training is highly stratified, with the result
that those with higher skills or educational attainment
are more likely to participate in training and in
training sponsored by their employers (Lynch, 1994;
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996; Scho¨mann, 1998;
OECD, 1999; O’Connell, 2002). The employed receive
more training than the unemployed, who in turn
receive more training than those not economically
active (O’Connell, 1999). Older workers are also less
likely to participate in job-related training (Gelderblom
and de Koning, 2002). Larger firms and those that pay
above average wages are also more likely to train their
employees (O’Connell, 2002). Part-time workers and
those on temporary contracts are less likely to receive
training (Arulampalam and Booth, 1998). These pat-
terns of participation suggest that current allocation
principles are in inverse relation to need, and training
is more likely to exacerbate rather than mitigate
existing labour market inequalities. In general, there
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is little evidence to suggest any marked gender
differences in access to training. The evidence on
gender differences in access to training is mixed
(O’Connell, 1999; Evertsson, 2004; Dieckhoff and
Steiber, 2010). Participation in training has also been
found to decline over the life course. This may be due
to the difficulty in recouping the costs of training in
either wages or productivity among older workers,
given that the time span for cost recovery is shorter
among older workers. In the United Kingdom, a great
deal of training has been found to be induction
training of new recruits (Booth and Bryan, 2002).
Trade unions represent an important labour market
institution that may affect training either directly,
through training agreements, or indirectly, through
wage bargaining. The empirical results on the impact
of unions on training are mixed. A number of studies
have found a positive impact of union membership or
presence on training: for example, in the United States
(Lynch, 1992), the United Kingdom (Booth et al.,
2003), and Germany (Dustmann and Scho¨nberg,
2004). On the other hand, however, Mincer (1983)
and Barron et al. (1987) find negative effects for the
United States, and Bassanini et al. (2005) find no
significant effect of unions across the 13 countries
covered by the ECHP.
There are a limited number of studies examining
the impact of HPWP on training. Osterman (1995) in
an analysis of firm-level data in the United States
shows that new forms of work organization are
associated with higher rates of training. He finds that
the main influential factors are related to quality
practices: quality circles, total quality management, and
statistical process control, each of which led to
increased training. Other more direct work practices,
such as team working and job rotation, did not. His
findings also suggest that the adoption of these work
practices are short term, but do not endure over time.
Osterman (1995) also found that enterprises that
responded positively to a question about their com-
mitment to increasing ‘the well-being of employees
with respect to their personal or family situation’
showed higher rates of training. This may be a proxy
for progressive employment policies. MacDuffie and
Kochan (1995) find that training is positively corre-
lated with the introduction of ‘lean production
systems’ and new work practices in the automobile
assembly industry. Whitfield (2000) shows that British
workplaces implementing HPWP have higher levels
of training. He also shows a strong correlation
between the adoption of a comprehensive net of such
practices (a bundle) and the amount or intensity of
training.
O’Connell (2007) finds that the presence of partici-
patory arrangements for deciding how work is actually
carried out is associated with a higher probability of
training. Similarly, employees reporting extensive con-
sultation relating to their jobs are also more likely to
have received training. These work practices are also
associated with an increased likelihood of participa-
tion in general rather than firm-specific training.
Similarly, Lynch and Black (1998) find that new
workplace practices such as total quality management
and benchmarking are linked with more general types
of training programmes.
Wage Effects of Training and
HPWP
The wealth of empirical research on the labour market
effects of initial education (see for example, De la
Fuente and Ciccone, 2002) stands in stark contrast to
the paucity of research on the effects of continuing
vocational training, which can still be characterized as
a developing field of inquiry. Most empirical work
suggests that there are positive wage returns to training
(see Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996 in the United
Kingdom; Scho¨mann and Becker, 2002 in Germany;
Goux and Maurin, 2000 in France). However, it should
be acknowledged that when selection effects are
controlled for, the returns are frequently found to be
small or even non-significant (see for example,
Dieckhoff, Jungblut and O’Connell, 2007).
Brunello (2001) in an analysis of ECHP data for
13 European countries finds that training, both on-
and off-the-job, increases current earnings growth
although this earnings growth is likely to be tempor-
ary. Earnings growth is somewhat higher for those
with upper secondary education than those with
tertiary education, and among the latter, the returns
to training decline with labour market experience,
perhaps because educational qualifications become
outdated over an extensive period of time.
One of the interesting findings from the literature
on the impact of training is that the wage returns may
be higher among those with low propensity to
participate in training (e.g. Bartell, 1995 in the
United States; Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996
and Booth, 1991 in the United Kingdom; Pischke, 1996
in Germany). Higher returns to training among
groups with low rates of training participation
(such as those with low educational attainment)
could be due to selection effects, but could also be
due to higher returns to training among those with
poor qualifications who nevertheless work in the
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primary segment of the labour market, or, in the
formulation of Booth and Zoega (2000), in ‘good’
firms, where the average stock of human capital is
high.
Human capital theory assumes a competitive labour
market in which trained employees receive their
marginal product, and thus the full fruits of their
labour enhanced by training. However, in a
non-competitive labour market workers may not
receive their full marginal product and the benefits
of training may be shared between employer and
employee. There is some evidence that the benefits of
training are shared between employer and employee.
Barron et al. (1989) found that the benefits of
training are split more or less equally between prod-
uctivity gains reaped by employers and wage increases
to employees in the United States. Dearden et al.
(2000) show that the effect of training on product-
ivity was twice as large as that on wages in a panel
study of British industries. Other studies that have
looked at the impact of training on corporate
performance also suggest that employers do appropri-
ate at least some of the returns to training
investments (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998; Barrett
and O’Connell, 2001).
Some of the returns to training are captured by
workers either with a time lag or when they change
employers. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) find that
the estimated effect of general training in a previous
job is three times higher than in the current job. Booth
and Bryan (2002) find that employer-provided training
increases wages in both current and future firms
and that the impact is larger in future firms. These
effects suggest that employers have some monopsony
power over their own trained workers so that trained
workers may not receive their marginal product and
that training, including general training paid for by
employers, may be transferable across jobs. These
effects are not consistent with the implications of the
human capital approach and the assumption of a
competitive labour market.
Research on the impact of HPWP is growing and
covers the effects on both employers and employees.
However, research on the impact of such practices on
wages remains somewhat sparse (see Handel and
Levine, 2004 for a review). Appelbaum et al. (2000),
in their study of the steel, apparel, and medical
instruments industries in the United States, show that
teamwork and an index of HPWP were associated with
higher earnings in steel and apparel, but not in medical
instruments. Batt (2001) found that work discretion
was positively associated with earnings, but that team
and quality circles were not when appropriate controls
were included in her model. Cappelli and Neumark
(2001) find higher earnings associated with HPWP in a
national survey of US manufacturing establishments,
but Black, Lynch and Krivelyova (2004) working
with the same data find that the positive effects of
HPWP are confined to unionized workplaces and to
non-production workers, while production workers’
wages are not affected. Handel and Gittelman found
no evidence of higher wages among employees in
firms that had implemented HPWP. Osterman (2000)
found no effect of HPWP in his study of a survey of
establishments. However, Osterman (2006) found
increased wages among blue-collar workers, attribut-
able to increased productivity, as well as increased
earnings among managers, achieved through different
channels. Forth and Millward (2004) found that
employees in high-involvement workplaces earned a
wage premium of 8 per cent compared with workers
in traditional workplaces. Kalmi and Kauhanen (2009)
found that a range of HPWPs, including self-
managed teams, traditional teams, information sharing,
incentivized pay, as well as training, which they regard
as an inherent component of HPWP, were all
associated with higher wages in a survey of Finnish
employees. If training is an inherent element of
HPWP arrangements, then we might expect to find
that other HPWP have positive effects on training
and that if HPWP and training both have positive
effects on wages, then the impact of training could be
reduced when other components of HPWP are
controlled for.
Data and Findings
This article draws on the Survey of Employees’ Attitudes
and Experiences of the Workplace conducted by the
Economic and Social Research Institute and commis-
sioned by the Irish National Centre for Partnership
and Performance (O’Connell et al., 2004). This is a
sample survey of 5,200 employees, conducted in mid
2003, designed to collect information relating to
characteristics of jobs and workplaces, workplace
practices, participation and involvement, experience
of and attitudes to change, as well as a series of
conventional socio-demographic indicators (age,
gender, education, occupation, etc.). The survey also
collects information on employer-sponsored training
and includes information on whether the training
received is general or specific in nature.1 In the
analyses that follow, binary and multinomial probit
models are used to assess the determinants of training.
With respect to the methodology used to model the
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impact of training on earnings, we begin with a
standard Mincer-type wage model and then include
relevant variables. At each step of the analysis,
propensity score matching (PSM) and sensitivity tests
are carried out in order to test the robustness of our
findings (see Aakvik, 2001; DiPrete and Gangl, 2004;
Mavromaras, McGuinness and Fok, 2007). Sample
means and training rates are shown in Table 1.
Training Patterns
Overall 48 per cent of employees report that they
participated in training provided by their present
employer over the last 2 years. The variation in
employer-sponsored training shows a familiar pattern.
Males are somewhat more likely than females to
participate in training. Workers aged 25–39 are most
likely to receive training, and training incidence
declines substantially among those aged 55 years.
Training participation is closely linked to educational
attainment: only 37 per cent of those with a lower
secondary qualification received training, compared
with almost 60 per cent of those with third-level
qualifications.
There is also variation in training according to job
characteristics: full-time workers are more likely to
receive training than part-time workers; permanent
workers receive more training than those on temporary
contracts. Tenure with the current employer is also
important with all those who have been in a job for
more than a year more likely to receive training than
those who have less than a year of job tenure. Union
members are substantially more likely to have
participated in training than non-members.
In relation to organizational characteristics, training
is much more common in the public sector: almost 60
per cent of workers in the public sector compared to
45 per cent of those in the private sector participated
in employer-sponsored training in the previous 2 years.
There is some variation according to the sector of
employment: training incidence is highest in Public
Administration and Defense (65%), followed by
Transport and Communications (56%), while training
incidence is lowest in Other Services (40%) (data not
shown). Training is also strongly influenced by estab-
lishment size: those working in establishments with
100 or more employees are twice as likely to partici-
pate in training as those in establishments with 1–4
employees (63 versus 29%, respectively). Training
incidence is substantially higher among those who
are personally involved in participatory work arrange-
ments and those covered by performance reward
systems.
Modelling the Determinants of Training
Table 2 presents a series of probit regression models
of training incidence, measured as a binary variable,
and coded 1 if any employer-sponsored training was
Table 1 Sample means and standard deviations
(weighted)
Variable
mean
Training
rate
Training
Any training 0.48 48.2
Personal characteristics
Female 0.46 46.4
Age 36.3 35.6
Age (years)2 5.9 5.89
Age 25–39 0.40 50.6
Age 40–54 0.30 46.7
Age 55þ 0.08 38.4
Lower secondary 0.16 37.1
Upper secondary 0.51 49.9
University 0.21 59.3
Married 0.54 49.9
Job characteristics
Temporary contract 0.15 37.5
29 hours or less 0.18 39.3
51 year with current
employer
0.16 36.8
1–5 years with current
employer
0.36 51.0
Years employed 8.3 8.7
Years employed2 2.5 2.5
Trade union member 0.38 59.2
Organization structure
and change
Public sector 0.19 59.5
55 Employees 29.4
5–19 Employees 0.25 43.5
20–99 Employees 0.31 48.8
100–500 Employees 0.30 58.0
500þ Employees 63.2
Part of larger organization 0.70 50.8
Reorganization of company 0.38 57.7
New technology introduced 0.48 57.9
New chief executive 0.25 61.9
Introduction of family
friendly policies
0.25 60.6
HPWP
Participation 0.26 65.8
Consultation 2.3 2.1
Performance reward
systems
0.12 68.3
Progressive employment
policies
0.76 53.6
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undertaken over the previous 2 years. Equation 1
includes only personal characteristics. The results show
that females are less likely than males to have
participated in training. Age is also influential, as
older workers are less likely to receive training than
younger workers. As expected, educational attainment
is important: those who have attained upper secondary
or university education are more likely to have
participated in training than those with lower levels
of educational attainment. Employees who are married
or living with a partner are also more likely to receive
training.
Equation 2 adds job characteristics. In line with our
expectations, temporary workers are less likely to have
received training than permanent employees, as are
part-time workers relative to full-time workers. Also as
expected, tenure in the current job has a positive
influence on the probability of receiving training.
Union members and members of staff associations are
also more likely to have trained. The inclusion of job
characteristics eliminates the observed gender and age
differences in training participation. The effects of
education are diminished, but remain significant.
Equation 3 then considers organizational character-
istics and change.2 Size is important: the larger the
organization, the greater the likelihood that an em-
ployee has participated in training. In addition,
organizational changes in the past 2 years, such as
the introduction of substantial new technology, the
appointment of a new chief executive or equivalent, or
the introduction of family friendly policies, are all
associated with an increased likelihood of training.
When these organizational characteristics are added to
the model, the coefficients for education levels have
again diminished, but remain significant.
Equation 4 then adds a series of HPWP, related to
the implementation of specific HPWP. There is
considerable variation in the literature in how HPWP
are operationalized (see for example Addison, 2005).
We measure three core dimensions of HPWP:
Table 2 Binary probit regression model of determinants of participation in training
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4
Coefficient P4z Coefficient P4z Coefficient P4z Coefficient P4z
Constant 3.607 0.000 1.233 0.095 0.917 0.233 0.458 0.559
Female 0.094 0.013 0.035 0.394 0.041 0.359 0.017 0.701
Age 0.091 0.000 0.026 0.206 0.006 0.770 0.001 0.955
Age2 1.096 0.000 0.223 0.376 0.027 0.918 0.132 0.617
Upper secondary education 0.316 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.199 0.000
Third-level education 0.595 0.000 0.567 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.334 0.000
Married 0.123 0.008 0.116 0.015 0.113 0.019 0.082 0.095
Temporary contract 0.131 0.027 0.154 0.012 0.097 0.117
Part time 0.129 0.013 0.043 0.423 0.031 0.570
Years employed 0.034 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.035 0.000
Years employed2 0.242 0.000 0.219 0.000 0.225 0.000
Union member 0.448 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.247 0.000
Public sector 0.166 0.019 0.161 0.026
5–10 employees 0.242 0.000 0.220 0.001
11–20 employees 0.241 0.000 0.217 0.002
100þ employees 0.412 0.000 0.354 0.000
Large organization 0.037 0.391 0.007 0.866
Reorganization 0.063 0.175 0.054 0.254
New technology 0.199 0.000 0.157 0.000
New CEO 0.146 0.003 0.134 0.008
Family friendly 0.189 0.000 0.087 0.068
Participation 0.291 0.000
Consultation 0.108 0.000
Performance 0.273 0.000
Programme policy 0.242 0.000
N 4548 4548 4548 4548
2 202.75*** 388.78*** 595.2*** 748.35***
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.0617 0.0944 0.1187
***Significant at 1%.
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participation, voice or consultation, and performance
reward systems. Participation is a dichotomous variable
scored 1 if employees report that their employer
provides them with a direct say in the way in which
work is actually carried out (including working in
teams, problem-solving groups, quality circles, con-
tinuous programmes or groups) and if the employee
personally participates in any of these groups.3
Consultation is a scale variable, indicating the fre-
quency with which employees are consulted about
decisions affecting their work, as well as whether any
attention is paid to their views, and thus represents a
measure of employee voice (Cronbach’s ¼ 0.84).
Performance Reward Systems is measured as a binary
variable coded 1 if the respondent is both subject to
regular performance reviews and receives performance-
related pay or profit sharing. We include an additional
related work practice: Progressive Employment Policies,
a binary variable scored 1 if the respondent is
employed in a workplace that has either a formal
explicit policy on respect and dignity at work and/or if
there is a formal explicit policy on equal opportunities
in the workplace. Table 2 shows that employees who
report that they participate directly in decisions about
how work is carried out are more likely to have
received training. Similarly, those who report greater
levels of consultation are more likely to have received
training than those who do not. Employees who
participate in performance reward systems are also
more likely to receive training as are those workers
employed in a workplace that has implemented
progressive employment policies.
Distinguishing between General and
Specific Training
One of the key distinctions in the economics of
training is that between ‘general’ versus ‘specific’
training. General training is defined in terms of its
transferability: general training may be of use to both
current and subsequent employers, whereas specific
training is of use only to the current employer. In the
Survey of Employees’ Attitudes and Experiences of the
Workplace respondents who indicated that they had
participated in employer education or training pro-
vided by their employer over the past 2 years were
asked:4
Do you feel that the skills or knowledge which you
have acquired in this education or training would be of
any use to you in getting a job with another employer
or was the education or training specific to your
current job only?
Of use in getting job with another employer 1
Of use only in current job 2
Eighty per cent of all education and training under-
taken by employees with employer sponsorship was
general in nature, considered by respondents to be ‘Of
use in getting a job with another employer’. Only
about 20 per cent of training was considered to be
specific, ‘of use only in current job’. This pattern,
whereby most training is general in nature, is similar
to that found in other countries (see for example,
Booth and Bryan, 2002 in the United Kingdom;
Pischke, 2000 in Germany; and Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1999 in the United States).
Women are somewhat more likely than men to
report that their training was general in nature.
Previous analysis of this data set (O’Connell, 2007)
shows that older workers are less likely than their
younger colleagues to participate in general training
and that a somewhat greater proportion of those
without any qualifications who received training
reported that it was general in nature, compared to
those with higher levels of educational attainment.
There were no significant differences in the nature of
training between full- and part-time workers, or
between employees on temporary versus permanent
contracts, although as we have seen permanent workers
are much more likely to receive training than tempor-
ary workers. A substantially greater proportion of
training in the public sector is specific to the current
employer (31 per cent) than is the case in the private
sector (17 per cent). The balance between general
versus specific training does not vary much by size of
organization.
In order to model the determinants of different
types of training, Table 3 reports the results of a
multinomial probit estimation, showing participation
in either general or specific training contrasted with no
training. As expected, overall the patterns differ
markedly between the two types of training.
In most respects, the factors that influence partici-
pation in any kind of training also influence general
training. This is true for educational qualifica-
tions, experience, trade union membership, firm
size, organizational change (new technology, CEO),
and HPWP. This is perhaps not surprising given that
about 80 per cent of all training is regarded as
general in nature. Employees who report that their
organization encourages direct participation in work-
place decisions or greater levels of consultation about
their work are more likely to have received general
training than those who do not. Furthermore,
employees who report that their workplace implements
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performance reward systems or progressive employ-
ment policies are more likely to receive general
training. These outcomes are entirely consistent with
the expectations and findings of previous HPWP
research.
When we consider the determinants of specific
training, again we find that some of the factors that
influence participation in any kind of training also
influence specific training: education, trade union
membership, organizational change (new technology,
CEO), as well as progressive employment policies.
Public sector workers and men are more likely to
receive specific, but not general, training. The only
HPWP to influence specific training is direct partici-
pation in the way work is carried out. This suggests
that employees’ participation in work teams, project
groups, or quality circles, etc. may require firm-specific
training in order to do so effectively, a finding that is
consistent with Handel and Levine (2004).
PSM and Rosenbaum Bounds Sensitivity
Analysis
Concluding from these analyses that employees work-
ing with HPWP arrangements are more likely to
receive training may not be the whole story because of
possible endogeneity. Individuals with a preference for
working in a HPWP environment may also have a
higher probability of participating in training. For
example, individuals with a particular propensity for
self-development may be likely to both seek out HPWP
arrangements and to participate in training. Failure to
control for this potential correlation will yield an
estimated HPWP effect on training that is biased. To
address this we used PSM and subsequent sensitivity
tests to examine the potential effect of both observed
and unobserved variables. As a first step, a series of
propensity scores was operationalized as the predicted
probability of employees engaging in each of the
Table 3 Multinomial probit regression of determinants of general training versus no training and specific
training versus no training
General training Specific training
Coefficient Standard
error
P4z Coefficient Standard
error
P4z
Constant 1.405 1.147 0.221 0.091 1.429 0.949
Female 0.038 0.066 0.560 0.184 0.083 0.027
Age 0.011 0.031 0.727 0.039 0.039 0.314
Age2 0.010 0.386 0.980 0.659 0.480 0.170
Upper secondary education 0.225 0.080 0.005 0.372 0.103 0.000
Third-level education 0.462 0.084 0.000 0.385 0.108 0.000
Married 0.110 0.071 0.118 0.081 0.089 0.366
Temporary contract 0.094 0.090 0.297 0.186 0.117 0.112
Part time 0.100 0.080 0.209 0.101 0.099 0.305
Years employed 0.059 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.016 0.176
Years employed2 0.351 0.088 0.000 0.197 0.111 0.076
Union member 0.298 0.071 0.000 0.410 0.090 0.000
Public sector 0.142 0.104 0.173 0.367 0.127 0.004
5–10 employees 0.316 0.101 0.002 0.240 0.126 0.058
11–20 employees 0.371 0.101 0.000 0.076 0.127 0.549
100þ employees 0.564 0.108 0.000 0.225 0.136 0.097
Large organization 0.047 0.064 0.464 0.087 0.080 0.277
Reorganization 0.057 0.068 0.401 0.102 0.084 0.226
New technology 0.193 0.063 0.002 0.221 0.079 0.005
New CEO 0.188 0.072 0.009 0.152 0.089 0.088
Family friendly 0.164 0.068 0.016 0.006 0.085 0.941
Participation 0.379 0.066 0.000 0.387 0.082 0.000
Consultation 0.180 0.029 0.000 0.051 0.036 0.159
Performance 0.436 0.093 0.000 0.088 0.124 0.478
Programme policy 0.344 0.080 0.000 0.256 0.106 0.016
N¼ 4548
2¼ 801.91***
***Significant at 1%.
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HPWP arrangements.5 Table 4 provides a summary of
diagnostics after PSM and covariate balancing. The
matching process created a high degree of covariate
balance between the treatment and control samples, as
can be seen from the reduction in pseudo R2 after
matching. There were no systematic differences in
the distribution of covariates between treatment
and control groups in the equations relating to
participation and performance reward systems. For
the progressive employment policies and consultation
equations, there was some evidence to suggest that
systematic differences hold in the distribution of
covariates between the treatment and control groups.
However, the pseudo R2 dropped substantially before
and after matching, indicating that most of the
variance has been accounted for.6
We then consider the difference in mean outcomes
in the matched samples to obtain an estimate of
the average treatment effect on the treated, given
that PSM removes most of the bias attributable to
observable covariates. Table 5 presents the estimates
of the unconditional ATT of each of the HPWP based
on the nearest-neighbour algorithm and compares
these to the marginal effects of the results shown in
Table 2. Column 1 of Table 5 gives mean outcomes
among treatment cases, while column 2 gives the mean
outcomes among all control cases in the sample. The
third column shows the mean outcome among the
matched controls. The average treatment effect of each
HPWP on the treated employees actually receiving the
treatment is given in column 4 and can be calculated
as the difference between columns 1 and 3. Column 5
shows the marginal effect for the effect of the HPWP
on training estimated in Equation 4, Table 3. Column
6 presents the number of treated and control cases in
the matched sample.
Table 5 shows that the estimated effect from PSM
supports the previous findings from the probit regres-
sion: employees engaged in each of the HPWP are
more likely to receive training. Compared with the
marginal effects derived from the probit regression
presented in Table 2, the matching estimates tend to be
slightly more conservative (i.e. lower) in the case of
participatory work practices, but higher for consult-
ation and performance reward systems.
Table 5 Treatment effects of HPWP on training, matching estimates
Yt Raw Yc Matched Yc ¼Y m/fx Treated Control
Participation
Training 0.656 0.443 0.557 0.099 0.116 1,409 3,117
General training 0.508 0.331 0.428 0.079 0.077 1,409 3,117
Specific training 0.147 0.101 0.128 0.019 0.026 1,409 3,117
Consultation
Training 0.534 0.391 0.460 0.073 0.043 3,470 1,022
General training 0.419 0.272 0.304 0.115 0.047 3,470 1,022
Progressive employment policies
Training 0.539 0.314 0.431 0.108 0.095 3,403 911
General training 0.415 0.244 0.325 0.089 0.082 3,403 911
Performance reward systems
Training 0.663 0.479 0.531 0.132 0.108 552 3,968
General training 0.570 0.360 0.416 0.153 0.126 552 3,968
Table 4 Summary of diagnostics after PSM and
covariate balancing
Pseudo R2 LR 2 P42
Participation
Nearest neighbour
Unmatched 0.158 889.03 0.000
Matched 0.006 25.16 0.799
Consultation
Nearest neighbour
Unmatched 0.102 494.96 0.000
Matched 0.019 186.62 0.000
Progressive employment policies
Nearest neighbour
Unmatched 0.223 1,014.14 0.000
Matched 0.050 470.49 0.000
Performance reward systems
Nearest Neighbour
Unmatched 0.239 806.85 0.000
Matched 0.024 36.63 0.262
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In order to estimate the extent to which selection on
unobservables may bias our inferences, we conducted a
Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analysis. Table 6 reports
the results of the P-values from Mantel–Haenszel tests
for the average treatment effect on the treated while
setting the level of hidden bias to a certain value r. At
each r, a hypothetical significance level ‘P-critical’ is
derived which represents the bound on the significance
level of the treatment effect in the case of endogenous
selection into treatment status. Table 6 reports the
Rosenbaum bounds on treatment effects when r¼ 1,
which in the model implies no unobserved selection
bias. It also reports the r value at which we would have
to question our conclusion of a positive effect,
meaning that a confounding variable could have an
equally strong effect on both treatment and outcome.
We see that robustness to hidden bias is rather similar
across each of the HPWP. The PSM test combined
with the sensitivity analysis suggests that the estimates
presented are unaffected by biases that may arise from
unobserved heterogeneity.
Wage Effects of Training and HPWP
We now turn to the results from the analyses of
earnings, measured here as the log of hourly net pay
for each individual employee. Because net earnings are
used, it is important to include marital status in the
wage equation because of Irish tax law, which despite
elements of individualization of the tax code, never-
theless provides substantial tax breaks for married
couples. The mean hourly earnings for our sample as a
whole are E11.75 (weighted). For those who received
training in the past 2 years, hourly earnings are
E12.61, compared with E10.96 for those who did not
receive training. This simple comparison strongly
suggests higher earnings for those who have received
training relative to those who have not. We conduct
regression analysis to see if the earnings difference
remains when we control for the variety of factors that
influence earnings other than participation in training.
We estimate standard ordinary least squares (OLS)
Mincer-type wage equations in which the standard
controls are included. In Table 7, we include a dummy
variable indicating if an employee has received training
in the past 2 years, and in Table 8 we include two
dummy variables measuring, respectively, whether an
employee has received general training or specific
training.
Equation 1 in Table 7 includes just personal
characteristics. Those who have received training in
the past 2 years are paid about 10 per cent higher more
than those who have not. Females earn 15 per cent less
than males, older workers earn more than younger
workers, and those with higher levels of education earn
more than those with lower levels of educational
attainment. Those who are married or living with a
partner earn more than those who are not married.
Equation 2 adds job characteristics and this reduces
the coefficient on training to 7 per cent, and the effects
of personal characteristics also fall somewhat. As
expected, workers on temporary contracts earn less
than those on permanent contracts. Part-time workers
earn higher hourly wages than full-time employees;
trade union/staff association members earn higher
wages than non-members.
Equation 3 adds variables pertaining to organiza-
tional characteristics and change, and the return to
training falls to 5 per cent. The patterns outlined above
in relation to personal and job characteristics remain
largely stable. In relation to the new variables added
to the model, those working in the public sector earn
about 7 per cent more than those working in the
private sector. Those working in larger organizations
earn more than those in smaller organizations.
Furthermore, employees working in companies that
are part of a larger organization earn higher wages.
Work organization changes are not significantly related
Table 6 Summary of Rosenbaum bounds for HPWP treatment effects
r Q-mhþ Q_mh p_mhþ p_mh
Participation 1.00 06.40 06.40 0.000 0.000
1.55 1.39 11.5 0.817 0.000
Consultation 1.00 06.83 06.83 0.000 0.000
1.55 1.35 12.49 0.088 0.000
Performance reward systems 1.00 4.527 4.527 0.000 0.000
1.55 1.483 7.639 0.069 0.000
Progressive employment policies 1.00 8.85 8.85 0.000 0.000
1.95 1.37 16.94 0.0850 0.000
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to wages, but the introduction of new technology does
increase wages.
Equation 4 then includes HPWP. Employees who
report that they participate directly in deciding how
work is carried out earn higher wages, as do employees
who are involved in performance reward systems. The
strength of consultation about work is also positively
related to wages. However, the presence of progressive
employment policies in the workplace does not have
any significant impact on wages, suggesting that that
there is no necessary correlation between well paid
work and progressive employment policies, and also
that employers do not use such policies as substitutes
for wages. The addition of the HPWP variables reduces
the return to training to just less than 4 per cent.
Finally, equation 5 examines whether training has a
greater impact when combined with HPWP by
specifying interaction terms between training and
each of participation, consultation, and performance
reward systems. None of the interaction terms reach
significance suggesting that the effect of training on
wages does not differ significantly across work prac-
tices, and that the impact of training does not increase
when it is combined or ‘bundled’ with HPWPs, as
hypothesized in some accounts (Ichniowsky et al.,
1996; Appelbaum et al., 2000).
Returns to General/Specific Training
Table 8 considers the returns to general and specific
training. Equation 1 presents the results in relation to
personal characteristics. Here the return to general
training is higher than the return to specific training;
10 per cent compared with 8 per cent, respectively.
When job characteristics are added, in Equation 2, the
return to specific training is eliminated, but those who
received general training in the past 2 years earn
almost 9 per cent more than those who did not. With
the addition of organizational characteristics in
Equation 3, the return to general training falls to 7
per cent, and the inclusion of work practices in
Equation 4 further reduces the return to general
training to just under 5 per cent. As in Table 7, above,
before, none of the interactions between general
training and HPWP—participation, consultation, or
performance reward systems—achieved statistical sig-
nificance suggesting that the effect of general training
on wages does not vary across work practices.
As before, the OLS estimates do not account for the
endogenous decision to participate in training.
Individuals who receive training may be substantially
different to those not receiving training either in terms
of observed or unobserved characteristics, and thus
standard regression estimation methods may produce
biased estimates of the effect of training on wages. As
before, this potential difficulty can be rectified using
PSM estimators and inferences can then be checked by
conducting sensitivity tests.
Table 9 shows that the estimated effects from PSM
support our findings of positive effects of training on
wages. Both the matching estimate and the OLS
estimate suggest that overall training is associated
with a 4 per cent wage premium, and general training
with a return of the order of 5–6 per cent. In order to
estimate the extent to which selection on unobservable
variables may bias our inference about the effect of
training on wages, Table 10 reports the results from a
Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity test. As before, the
bounds allow us to assess the extent to which an
unobserved variable must influence the selection
process in order to render the matching estimates
unreliable. The finding of a positive effect of training
overall is less robust to the presence of hidden bias
than the effect of general training. In respect of the
latter, the critical level of r at which we would have to
question our conclusion of a positive effect of general
training is 1.2—it is attained if an unobserved
covariate was to cause the odds ratio of training
versus no training to differ by a factor of about 1.2.
However, it should be noted that these results are
worst-case scenarios (see DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).
Furthermore, Aakvik (2001) argues that while the
sensitivity test shows how biases might alter inferences,
it does not indicate whether biases are present or what
magnitudes are plausible. Hence, we conclude that a
value for r of 1.2 does not mean that there is no true
positive effect of general training on wages. Rather, it
can be interpreted as conveying information about the
level of uncertainty contained in matching estimators
by showing just how large the influence of a
confounding variable must be to undermine the
Table 9 Treatment effects of training on wages,
matching estimates
N Yt Raw
Yc
Matched
Yc
¼Y OLS
Training
Treated 2275 2.53 2.35 2.49 0.038* 0.036
Control 2255
General training
Treated 1751 2.53 2.35 2.47 0.056* 0.047
Control 2255
*Significant at 5%.
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conclusion of the matching analysis. Moreover, it
should be noted in this respect that none of the
observed covariates specified in the training model
(Equation 4 in Table 3) achieved such influence over
the probability of participating in general training.
Therefore, using this approach we can conclude that
the estimated returns to general training are likely to
be robust with respect to possible selection bias,
although there is greater uncertainly in respect of
training overall (combining both general and specific
training). Furthermore, using this approach ensures
that levels of estimation bias are greatly reduced by
comparing the outcomes of individuals in the treat-
ment and control groups who hold very similar
characteristics in terms of individual, job, and work
practice characteristics.
Conclusions
This article started from the premise that the work-
place is an important site for the accumulation of
human capital. Our approach, therefore, has been to
bring together two research fields: the large and
relatively sophisticated training literature with the
growing literature on workplace practices. Our findings
suggest that workplaces are indeed important.
We estimate models of both the determinants and
the impact of training. Our model of training partici-
pation confirms much of the existing literature: age,
education, type of contract, tenure, and firm size are
all determinants of training. We also found that several
work practices are also influential: involvement in
highly participative or consultative working arrange-
ments; as well as the existence of performance reward
systems and progressive employment policies are all
associated with a higher probability of training. When
we distinguish between general and firm-specific
training, we find that several types of HPWP lead to
greater levels of general training. This is consistent
with the implication of the HPWP literature and
represents a challenge to the human capital approach
which has difficulty explaining why employers would
pay for general training.
To assess the impact of training, we estimate a series
of wage models. Simple models, controlling for
personal and job characteristics, show training to
have a significant impact on wages. The addition of
variables measuring organizational characteristics con-
firms that organizational factors are important influ-
ences on wages, and their inclusion also reduces the
estimated returns to training. We also find that several
dimensions of HPWP, particularly participation, con-
sultation, and performance reward systems, have a
significant impact on wages, and when these variables
are specified in the model, training continues to show
a modest, smaller, return. These returns are confined
to general training: we find no significant returns to
firm-specific training.
We have shown that individuals who are involved in
highly participative and consultative working arrange-
ments, and in organizations that implement perform-
ance reward systems, are more likely to train, and to
earn more, than those who are not. To assess whether
training has a greater impact when combined with
these HPWP, we specify a series of interaction terms
between training and HPWP, but found no evidence of
a wage return to such ‘bundles’ of practices.
The literature on the returns to training acknow-
ledges that individuals who receive training may be
substantially different to those not receiving training
either in terms of individual or workplace character-
istics (including HPWP), and thus standard regression
estimation methods may produce biased estimates of
the effect of training on wages. We apply a PSM
technique to ensure that our models of both the
determinants and returns to training are robust with
respect to possible selection bias.
We believe that the contribution of this article is to
suggest that future attempts to rigorously estimate the
impact of training on wages should take account of the
workplace and the social relations within it. Our
findings suggest that observed patterns of training and
returns to training are broadly consistent with the
Table 10 Summary of Rosenbaum bounds for training treatment effects
Gamma Sigþ Sig t-hatþ t-hat CIþ CI
Training 1.00 50.001 50.001 0.036 0.036 0.013 0.059
1.1 0.124 50.001 0.013 0.059 0.009 0.082
General training 1.00 5.001 50.001 0.060 0.060 0.033 0.086
1.2 0.123 50.001 0.015 0.105 0.011 0.131
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implications of the HPWP approach and represent a
challenge to elements of the human capital approach.
Notes
1. The survey we used does not collect information
on whether the training is conducted on-the-job
or off-the-job. While the survey also collects
information on the duration of training, the data
are of poor quality, with a highly skewed distri-
bution, and we decided that it was not of
sufficient quality to support analysis.
2. In this and all subsequent analyses, models that
include organizational characteristics also include
sectoral dummy variables that are not shown in
the tables because of space considerations. In the
present analysis, we found that construction and
health workers are more likely to have trained
than those in manufacturing, and those working
in hospitality are less likely.
3. Working in teams is included as a measure of
participation. Given the constraints of the data,
further investigation was not possible in relation
to different types of teamwork and the effect these
may have on employee outcomes.
4. We would argue that asking those directly involved
in the training and focusing on its transferability
represents a useful approach to capturing the Becker
distinction between general and specific training.
5. The independent variables include all variables
that were entered in the analyses of Table 2, with
the exception of the HPWP that formed the
dependent variable.
6. Throughout the PSM matching, we use a number
of different matching algorithms to match treat-
ment and control cases with similar propensity
scores, but the results from the nearest neighbour
are presented here as they provide the most
conservative results. Results for the other algo-
rithms are available from the authors.
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